Formal Certification Methods for Automated Vehicle Safety Assessment
Tong Zhao, Ekim Yurtsever, Joel Paulson, Giorgio Rizzoni

TL;DR
This paper reviews formal methods, especially reachability analysis, for verifying and certifying the safety of automated vehicles, proposing a unified scenario coverage framework and discussing future challenges.
Contribution
It provides the first comprehensive review of formal safety verification methods for AVs and introduces a unified scenario coverage framework for safety assessment.
Findings
Formal methods are crucial for AV safety guarantees.
A unified scenario coverage framework aids in safety verification.
Remaining challenges include scalability and real-world applicability.
Abstract
Challenges related to automated driving are no longer focused on just the construction of such automated vehicles (AVs), but in assuring the safety of their operation. Recent advances in Level 3 and Level 4 autonomous driving have motivated more extensive study in safety guarantees of complicated AV maneuvers, which aligns with the goal of ISO 21448 (Safety of the Intended Functions, or SOTIF), i.e. minimizing unsafe scenarios both known and unknown, as well as Vision Zero -- eliminating highway fatalities by 2050. A majority of approaches used in providing safety guarantees for AV motion control originate from formal methods, especially reachability analysis (RA), which relies on mathematical models for the dynamic evolution of the system to provide guarantees. However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there have been no review papers dedicated to describing and interpreting…
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