Few-Shot Backdoor Attacks on Visual Object Tracking
Yiming Li, Haoxiang Zhong, Xingjun Ma, Yong Jiang, Shu-Tao Xia

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel few-shot backdoor attack method on visual object tracking models, demonstrating its effectiveness in both digital and physical settings and highlighting vulnerabilities in current VOT systems.
Contribution
The paper presents a simple yet effective few-shot backdoor attack technique that optimizes feature and tracking losses, revealing security vulnerabilities in VOT models.
Findings
Backdoor can be embedded with few frames or data.
Attack significantly degrades tracker performance.
The attack is resistant to existing defenses.
Abstract
Visual object tracking (VOT) has been widely adopted in mission-critical applications, such as autonomous driving and intelligent surveillance systems. In current practice, third-party resources such as datasets, backbone networks, and training platforms are frequently used to train high-performance VOT models. Whilst these resources bring certain convenience, they also introduce new security threats into VOT models. In this paper, we reveal such a threat where an adversary can easily implant hidden backdoors into VOT models by tempering with the training process. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective few-shot backdoor attack (FSBA) that optimizes two losses alternately: 1) a \emph{feature loss} defined in the hidden feature space, and 2) the standard \emph{tracking loss}. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our FSBA, it can trick the model to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsVideo Surveillance and Tracking Methods · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · User Authentication and Security Systems
