Invasion Dynamics in the Biased Voter Process
Loke Durocher, Panagiotis Karras, Andreas Pavlogiannis, Josef Tkadlec

TL;DR
This paper investigates how to optimally select initial agents to maximize the spread of a trait in a biased voter model, revealing computational hardness and proposing approximation strategies.
Contribution
It proves NP-hardness of fixation probability maximization and shows submodularity for the case of bias towards invasion, enabling greedy approximation algorithms.
Findings
Fixation maximization is NP-hard for both bias directions.
Submodularity holds when bias favors invasion, allowing greedy algorithms.
Experimental results support the theoretical findings.
Abstract
The voter process is a classic stochastic process that models the invasion of a mutant trait (e.g., a new opinion, belief, legend, genetic mutation, magnetic spin) in a population of agents (e.g., people, genes, particles) who share a resident trait , spread over the nodes of a graph. An agent may adopt the trait of one of its neighbors at any time, while the invasion bias quantifies the stochastic preference towards () or against () adopting over . Success is measured in terms of the fixation probability, i.e., the probability that eventually all agents have adopted the mutant trait . In this paper we study the problem of fixation probability maximization under this model: given a budget , find a set of agents to initiate the invasion that maximizes the fixation probability. We show that the problem is NP-hard for both and ,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Applications
