WebSpec: Towards Machine-Checked Analysis of Browser Security Mechanisms
Lorenzo Veronese, Benjamin Farinier, Pedro Bernardo, Mauro Tempesta,, Marco Squarcina, Matteo Maffei

TL;DR
WebSpec is a formal framework that automates the analysis of browser security mechanisms, discovering logical flaws and verifying security invariants using machine-checked proofs and model checking.
Contribution
It introduces the first comprehensive formal security framework for browsers, combining a semantic model, security invariants, and automated proof and testing tools.
Findings
Discovered two new logical flaws in browser security mechanisms.
Identified three known flaws in current Web platforms and five in older versions.
Validated proposed security improvements through formal verification.
Abstract
The complexity of browsers has steadily increased over the years, driven by the continuous introduction and update of Web platform components, such as novel Web APIs and security mechanisms. Their specifications are manually reviewed by experts to identify potential security issues. However, this process has proved to be error-prone due to the extensiveness of modern browser specifications and the interplay between new and existing Web platform components. To tackle this problem, we developed WebSpec, the first formal security framework for the analysis of browser security mechanisms, which enables both the automatic discovery of logical flaws and the development of machine-checked security proofs. WebSpec, in particular, includes a comprehensive semantic model of the browser in the Coq proof assistant, a formalization in this model of ten Web security invariants, and a toolchain…
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Taxonomy
TopicsWeb Application Security Vulnerabilities · Security and Verification in Computing · Access Control and Trust
