Reusing Verification Assertions as Security Checkers for Hardware Trojan Detection

TL;DR

This paper proposes reusing existing verification assertions as security checkers to detect hardware Trojans in integrated circuits, demonstrating scalability and effectiveness without relying on Trojan activation mechanisms.

Contribution

It introduces a novel approach to repurpose verification assertions as security monitors for hardware Trojan detection, leveraging existing assets and a new security metric.

Findings

Scales to industry-size circuits with over 100 assertions

Effective detection without Trojan activation mechanisms

Validated on OpenTitan SoC IPs

Abstract

Globalization in the semiconductor industry enables fabless design houses to reduce their costs, save time, and make use of newer technologies. However, the offshoring of Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication has negative sides, including threats such as Hardware Trojans (HTs) - a type of malicious logic that is not trivial to detect. One aspect of IC design that is not affected by globalization is the need for thorough verification. Verification engineers devise complex assets to make sure designs are bug-free, including assertions. This knowledge is typically not reused once verification is over. The premise of this paper is that verification assets that already exist can be turned into effective security checkers for HT detection. For this purpose, we show how assertions can be used as online monitors. To this end, we propose a security metric and an assertion selection flow that leverages Cadence JasperGold Security Path Verification (SPV). The experimental results show that our approach scales for industry-size circuits by analyzing more than 100 assertions for different Intellectual Properties (IPs) of the OpenTitan System-on-Chip (SoC). Moreover, our detection solution is pragmatic since it does not rely on the HT activation mechanism.