Blockchain Nash Dynamics and the Pursuit of Compliance
Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Thomas Zacharias

TL;DR
This paper models Nash dynamics in blockchain protocols to analyze their compliance and stability, evaluating how different reward schemes and costs influence participants' incentives to follow honest protocols.
Contribution
It introduces a formal model for Nash dynamics in blockchain and assesses protocol compliance across PoW and PoS schemes under various conditions.
Findings
PoS ledgers with resource-proportional rewards are compliant if costs are negligible.
PoW and PoS protocols show different compliance behaviors based on network lossiness.
Externalities like exchange rate fluctuations can be mitigated with economic penalties.
Abstract
We study Nash-dynamics in the context of blockchain protocols. We introduce a formal model, within which one can assess whether the Nash dynamics can lead utility-maximizing participants to defect from the "honest" protocol operation, towards variations that exhibit one or more undesirable infractions, such as abstaining from participation and producing conflicting protocol histories. Blockchain protocols that do not lead to such infraction states are said to be compliant. Armed with this model, we evaluate the compliance of various Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol families, with respect to different utility functions and reward schemes, leading to the following results: i) PoS ledgers under resource-proportional rewards can be compliant if costs are negligible, but non-compliant if costs are significant; ii) PoW and PoS under block-proportional rewards exhibit…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
