Preference Swaps for the Stable Matching Problem
Eduard Eiben, Gregory Gutin, Philip R. Neary, Cl\'ement Rambaud,, Magnus Wahlstr\"om, Anders Yeo

TL;DR
This paper extends the analysis of minimal swaps needed to achieve stability in the Stable Matching Problem to the many-to-many case, introduces a new representation, and proves computational hardness results.
Contribution
It generalizes previous polynomial-time algorithms to the many-to-many SMP and establishes NP-hardness and W[1]-hardness for related decision problems.
Findings
Generalization of swap-based stability algorithms to many-to-many SMP
NP-hardness of deciding minimal swaps for stability
W[1]-hardness and exponential time lower bounds for the problem
Abstract
An instance of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as a smallest perturbation of . Boehmer et al. (2021) designed a polynomial-time algorithm to find the minimum number of swaps required to turn a given maximal matching into a stable matching. We generalize this result to the many-to-many version of SMP. We do so first by introducing a new representation of SMP as an extended bipartite graph and subsequently by reducing the problem to submodular minimization. It is a natural problem to establish the computational complexity of deciding whether at most swaps are enough to turn into an instance where one of the maximum matchings is stable. Using a hardness result of Gupta et al. (2020), we…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
