An AGM Approach to Revising Preferences

TL;DR

This paper introduces an AGM-inspired formal framework for revising preferences when new conflicting information is received, ensuring minimal change and rational consistency.

Contribution

It extends belief change theory to preference revision, proposing rationality postulates and representation theorems for preference adjustment.

Findings

Preference change can be modeled as a choice function guided by initial rankings.

The proposed operators satisfy the rationality postulates.

Preference revision aligns with belief change operators within the AGM framework.

Abstract

We look at preference change arising out of an interaction between two elements: the first is an initial preference ranking encoding a pre-existing attitude; the second element is new preference information signaling input from an authoritative source, which may come into conflict with the initial preference. The aim is to adjust the initial preference and bring it in line with the new preference, without having to give up more information than necessary. We model this process using the formal machinery of belief change, along the lines of the well-known AGM approach. We propose a set of fundamental rationality postulates, and derive the main results of the paper: a set of representation theorems showing that preference change according to these postulates can be rationalized as a choice function guided by a ranking on the comparisons in the initial preference order. We conclude by presenting operators satisfying our proposed postulates. Our approach thus allows us to situate preference revision within the larger family of belief change operators.