A Formal Model for Polarization under Confirmation Bias in Social Networks
M\'ario S. Alvim, Bernardo Amorim, Sophia Knight, Santiago Quintero,, Frank Valencia

TL;DR
This paper introduces a formal model for social polarization influenced by confirmation bias, analyzing how network structure affects whether polarization persists or vanishes, with implications for understanding social dynamics.
Contribution
It extends the DeGroot model by incorporating confirmation bias and provides conditions under which polarization persists or diminishes in social networks.
Findings
Polarization vanishes in strongly-connected influence graphs.
In regular symmetric circulation graphs, agents converge to a unique belief.
Polarization may persist in weakly-connected graphs under confirmation bias.
Abstract
We describe a model for polarization in multi-agent systems based on Esteban and Ray's standard family of polarization measures from economics. Agents evolve by updating their beliefs (opinions) based on an underlying influence graph, as in the standard DeGroot model for social learning, but under a confirmation bias; i.e., a discounting of opinions of agents with dissimilar views. We show that even under this bias polarization eventually vanishes (converges to zero) if the influence graph is strongly-connected. If the influence graph is a regular symmetric circulation, we determine the unique belief value to which all agents converge. Our more insightful result establishes that, under some natural assumptions, if polarization does not eventually vanish then either there is a disconnected subgroup of agents, or some agent influences others more than she is influenced. We also prove that…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Media Influence and Politics · Game Theory and Applications
