Quantum Metrology with Delegated Tasks
Nathan Shettell, Damian Markham

TL;DR
This paper explores the delegation of quantum metrology tasks to untrusted third parties, proposing cryptographic protocols to ensure security and integrity in the presence of malicious actors.
Contribution
It introduces cryptographic protocols for secure delegation of quantum metrology tasks and analyzes their effectiveness against malicious third parties.
Findings
Protocols can prevent bias and information leakage by untrusted parties.
Security depends on the soundness of the cryptographic protocols.
Framework links quantum metrology security to cryptographic robustness.
Abstract
A quantum metrology scheme can be decomposed into three quantum tasks: state preparation, parameter encoding and measurements. Consequently, it is imperative to have access to the technologies which can execute the aforementioned tasks to fully implement a quantum metrology scheme. In the absence of one or more of these technologies, one can proceed by delegating the tasks to a third party. However, doing so has security ramifications: the third party can bias the result or leak information. In this article, we outline different scenarios where one or more tasks are delegated to an untrusted (and possibly malicious) third party. In each scenario, we outline cryptographic protocols which can be used to circumvent malicious activity. Further, we link the effectiveness of the quantum metrology scheme to the soundness of the cryptographic protocols.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture · Quantum Information and Cryptography · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
