EXT-TAURUM P2T: an Extended Secure CAN-FD Architecture for Road Vehicles
Franco Oberti, Alessandro Savino, Ernesto Sanchez, Filippo Parisi,, Stefano Di Carlo

TL;DR
This paper introduces EXT-TAURUM P2T, a low-cost secure CAN-FD architecture for vehicles that enhances communication security among ECUs through novel key management, throughput control, and hardware signatures, addressing automotive cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Contribution
It presents a novel, practical secure CAN-FD architecture with a key provisioning strategy and hardware signature mechanisms, demonstrated through experimental implementation.
Findings
Feasibility confirmed via experimental implementation
Enhanced security for automotive ECUs
Low-cost architecture suitable for real-world deployment
Abstract
The automobile industry is no longer relying on pure mechanical systems; instead, it benefits from advanced Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in order to provide new and complex functionalities in the effort to move toward fully connected cars. However, connected cars provide a dangerous playground for hackers. Vehicles are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks as they come equipped with more connected features and control systems. This situation may expose strategic assets in the automotive value chain. In this scenario, the Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most widely used communication protocol in the automotive domain. However, this protocol lacks encryption and authentication. Consequently, any malicious/hijacked node can cause catastrophic accidents and financial loss. Starting from the analysis of the vulnerability connected to the CAN communication protocol in the…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
