On Improving Resource Allocations by Sharing

TL;DR

This paper introduces a formal model for resource sharing among social network neighbors to improve allocations without reassigning resources, optimizing social welfare and reducing envy.

Contribution

It presents algorithms for optimizing social welfare and envy reduction through sharing, with complexity analysis and polynomial solutions for specific network structures.

Findings

Algorithms for utilitarian and egalitarian welfare optimization

Complexity results for general networks

Polynomial algorithms for path and tree structures

Abstract

Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a sharing concept allowing resources being shared with social network neighbors of the resource owners. To this end, we introduce a formal model that allows a central authority to compute an optimal sharing between neighbors based on an initial allocation. Advocating this point of view, we focus on the most basic scenario where a resource may be shared by two neighbors in a social network and each agent can participate in a bounded number of sharings. We present algorithms for optimizing utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare of allocations and for reducing the number of envious agents. In particular, we examine the computational complexity with respect to several natural parameters. Furthermore, we study cases with restricted social network structures and, among others, devise polynomial-time algorithms in path- and tree-like (hierarchical) social networks.