EEF1-NN: Efficient and EF1 allocations through Neural Networks
Shaily Mishra, Manisha Padala, Sujit Gujar

TL;DR
This paper introduces EEF1-NN, a neural network model that efficiently finds allocations that are approximately envy-free up to one item and maximize social welfare, outperforming existing methods in speed and quality.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel neural network architecture, inspired by UNet, for efficiently approximating EF1 and maximum social welfare allocations in fair division problems.
Findings
EEF1-NN achieves near-optimal social welfare in allocations.
The model guarantees high probability of EF1 across various distributions.
EEF1-NN is faster and more scalable than traditional optimization methods.
Abstract
Neural networks have shown state-of-the-art performance in designing auctions, where the network learns the optimal allocations and payment rule to ensure desirable properties. Motivated by the same, we focus on learning fair division of resources, with no payments involved. Our goal is to allocate the items, goods and/or chores efficiently among the fair allocations. By fair, we mean an allocation that is Envy-free (EF). However, such an allocation may not always exist for indivisible resources. Therefore, we consider the relaxed notion, Envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) that is guaranteed to exist. However, it is not enough to guarantee EF1 since the allocation of empty bundles is also EF1. Hence, we add the further constraint of efficiency, maximum utilitarian social welfare (USW). In general finding, USW allocations among EF1 is an NP-Hard problem even when valuations are additive.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications
