A Synergy of Institutional Incentives and Networked Structures in Evolutionary Game Dynamics of Multi-agent Systems

TL;DR

This paper investigates how institutional incentives and network structures interact to promote prosocial behaviors in multi-agent systems, revealing conditions where their combination leads to more effective cooperation than either mechanism alone.

Contribution

It demonstrates the interplay between incentives and network structures in evolutionary game dynamics, highlighting conditions for synergy versus interference in promoting prosocial behaviors.

Findings

Synergy occurs over a wider parameter range than interference.

Combined incentives and network structures reduce the cost needed to promote prosocial behaviors.

Interaction effects depend on specific game parameters.

Abstract

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours (e.g., cooperation and trust) among self-interested agents is an important problem in many disciplines. Network structure and institutional incentives (e.g., punishing antisocial agents) are known to promote prosocial behaviours, when acting in isolation, one mechanism being present at a time. Here we study the interplay between these two mechanisms to see whether they are independent, interfering or synergetic. Using evolutionary game theory, we show that punishing antisocial agents and a regular networked structure not only promote prosocial behaviours among agents playing the trust game, but they also interplay with each other, leading to interference or synergy, depending on the game parameters. Synergy emerges on a wider range of parameters than interference does. In this domain, the combination of incentives and networked structure improves the efficiency of incentives, yielding prosocial behaviours at a lower cost than the incentive does alone. This has a significant implication in the promotion of prosocial behaviours in multi-agent systems.