Game-Theoretic Model Based Resource Allocation During Floods

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model for equitable resource allocation among multiple simultaneous flood emergencies, aiming to optimize fairness and efficiency under limited resource constraints.

Contribution

It develops a strategic game model for resource distribution during floods, addressing the challenge of fair allocation among competing emergency locations.

Findings

Derived optimal strategies for resource allocation.

Demonstrated effectiveness of the game model in simulated scenarios.

Provided insights into fair resource distribution during natural disasters.

Abstract

For multiple emergencies caused by natural disasters, it is crucial to allocate resources equitably to each emergency location, especially when the availability of resources is limited in quantity. This paper has developed a multi-event crisis management system using a non-cooperative, complete information, strategic form game model. In the proposed system, each emergency event is assumed to occur in different locations simultaneously. These locations are represented as the players in the game, competing with the other players for an optimal allocation of scarce resources available at different resource stations. The players incur a non-monetary cost for obtaining resource units. The objective of the proposed game is to derive optimal strategies for an effective and fair allocation of resources to the respective players.