Robust Online Selection with Uncertain Offer Acceptance
Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Mohit Singh, Alejandro Toriello

TL;DR
This paper addresses an online selection problem where candidates accept offers probabilistically, proposing a robust policy that maximizes the minimum acceptance probability across top candidates, with solutions derived via Markov decision processes.
Contribution
It introduces a new secretary problem model with uncertain acceptance, deriving optimal policies using linear programming and Markov decision process theory, including bounds and simple threshold rules.
Findings
Optimal policy is a threshold rule for p ≥ 0.6.
Linear programs provide bounds and policies for the model.
The approach generalizes to other online selection problems.
Abstract
Online advertising has motivated interest in online selection problems. Displaying ads to the right users benefits both the platform (e.g., via pay-per-click) and the advertisers (by increasing their reach). In practice, not all users click on displayed ads, while the platform's algorithm may miss the users most disposed to do so. This mismatch decreases the platform's revenue and the advertiser's chances to reach the right customers. With this motivation, we propose a secretary problem where a candidate may or may not accept an offer according to a known probability . Because we do not know the top candidate willing to accept an offer, the goal is to maximize a robust objective defined as the minimum over integers of the probability of choosing one of the top candidates, given that one of these candidates will accept an offer. Using Markov decision process theory, we derive…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Search Problems · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Auction Theory and Applications
