The Global State of Security in Industrial Control Systems: An Empirical Analysis of Vulnerabilities around the World
Simon Daniel Duque Anton, Daniel Fraunholz, Daniel Krohmer, Daniel, Reti, Daniel Schneider, Hans Dieter Schotten

TL;DR
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the global security state of industrial control systems by examining publicly accessible OT-devices, revealing widespread vulnerabilities and regional disparities.
Contribution
It offers the first large-scale empirical assessment of OT-device vulnerabilities worldwide using data from Shodan and vulnerability databases.
Findings
Over 13,000 OT-devices identified with at least one vulnerability
European and North American regions most affected
Most devices contain multiple vulnerabilities
Abstract
Operational Technology (OT)-networks and -devices, i.e. all components used in industrial environments, were not designed with security in mind. Efficiency and ease of use were the most important design characteristics. However, due to the digitisation of industry, an increasing number of devices and industrial networks is opened up to public networks. This is beneficial for administration and organisation of the industrial environments. However, it also increases the attack surface, providing possible points of entry for an attacker. Originally, breaking into production networks meant to break an Information Technology (IT)-perimeter first, such as a public website, and then to move laterally to Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) to influence the production environment. However, many OT-devices are connected directly to the Internet, which drastically increases the threat of compromise,…
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