Aggregation of Models, Choices, Beliefs, and Preferences
Hamed Hamze Bajgiran, Houman Owhadi

TL;DR
This paper characterizes rational aggregation rules for models and preferences, demonstrating that all such rules can be represented as weighted averages over a ranked set of models or experts, unifying diverse economic aggregation procedures.
Contribution
It provides a unified representation of rational aggregation rules, showing they are all based on weighted averages over a ranking of models or experts, extending across economic theory.
Findings
All rational aggregation rules are of the form (3) involving weighted averages over a ranking.
The representation unifies aggregation procedures in social choice, belief formation, and decision making.
Applications include belief formation, choice theory, and social welfare economics.
Abstract
A natural notion of rationality/consistency for aggregating models is that, for all (possibly aggregated) models and , if the output of model is and if the output model is , then the output of the model obtained by aggregating and must be a weighted average of and . Similarly, a natural notion of rationality for aggregating preferences of ensembles of experts is that, for all (possibly aggregated) experts and , and all possible choices and , if both and prefer over , then the expert obtained by aggregating and must also prefer over . Rational aggregation is an important element of uncertainty quantification, and it lies behind many seemingly different results in economic theory: spanning social choice, belief formation, and individual decision making. Three examples of rational aggregation rules…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems
