Whose Bias?

TL;DR

This paper models how bias in law enforcement and decision-makers affects conviction outcomes, revealing complex preferences for bias levels among innocent defendants.

Contribution

It introduces a formal framework analyzing the strategic effects of bias in law enforcement and decision-making processes.

Findings

Bias influences conviction probabilities and defendant preferences.

Innocent defendants may prefer biased law enforcement over unbiased decision-makers.

Optimal bias levels depend on strategic interactions between law enforcement and decision-makers.

Abstract

Law enforcement acquires costly evidence with the aim of securing the conviction of a defendant, who is convicted if a decision-maker's belief exceeds a certain threshold. Either law enforcement or the decision-maker is biased and is initially overconfident that the defendant is guilty. Although an innocent defendant always prefers an unbiased decision-maker, he may prefer that law enforcement have some bias to none. Nevertheless, fixing the level of bias, an innocent defendant may prefer that the decision-maker, not law enforcement, is biased.