Post-Quantum Simulatable Extraction with Minimal Assumptions: Black-Box and Constant-Round

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new framework for post-quantum secure two-party computation that is constant-round, black-box, and relies on minimal assumptions, achieving $ ext{epsilon}$-simulatable security against quantum adversaries.

Contribution

It constructs the first $ ext{epsilon}$-simulatable 2PC protocol under minimal assumptions, with constant-round and black-box security, and extends to various cryptographic primitives.

Findings

First $ ext{epsilon}$-simulatable 2PC against QPT adversaries

Achieves security with minimal assumptions like post-quantum semi-honest OT

Provides protocols for commitments, coin-flipping, and arguments of knowledge secure against quantum attacks

Abstract

From the minimal assumption of post-quantum semi-honest oblivious transfers, we build the first $\epsilon$-simulatable two-party computation (2PC) against quantum polynomial-time (QPT) adversaries that is both constant-round and black-box (for both the construction and security reduction). A recent work by Chia, Chung, Liu, and Yamakawa (FOCS'21) shows that post-quantum 2PC with standard simulation-based security is impossible in constant rounds, unless either $\mathbf{NP} \subseteq \mathbf{BQP}$ or relying on non-black-box simulation. The $\epsilon$-simulatability we target is a relaxation of the standard simulation-based security that allows for an arbitrarily small noticeable simulation error $\epsilon$. Moreover, when quantum communication is allowed, we can further weaken the assumption to post-quantum secure one-way functions (PQ-OWFs), while maintaining the constant-round and black-box property. Our techniques also yield the following set of constant-round and black-box two-party protocols secure against QPT adversaries, only assuming black-box access to PQ-OWFs: - extractable commitments for which the extractor is also an $\epsilon$-simulator; - $\epsilon$-zero-knowledge commit-and-prove whose commit stage is extractable with $\epsilon$-simulation; - $\epsilon$-simulatable coin-flipping; - $\epsilon$-zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for $\mathbf{NP}$ for which the knowledge extractor is also an $\epsilon$-simulator; - $\epsilon$-zero-knowledge arguments for $\mathbf{QMA}$. At the heart of the above results is a black-box extraction lemma showing how to efficiently extract secrets from QPT adversaries while disturbing their quantum state in a controllable manner, i.e., achieving $\epsilon$-simulatability of the post-extraction state of the adversary.