Non-reciprocal interactions enhance heterogeneity
Timoteo Carletti, Riccardo Muolo

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that non-reciprocal long-range interactions in networked systems can destabilize homogeneous states and induce complex pattern formation, expanding understanding of heterogeneity in various natural systems.
Contribution
It provides theoretical conditions under which non-symmetric coupling leads to pattern formation, highlighting the role of non-reciprocal interactions in destabilizing homogeneous equilibria.
Findings
Non-reciprocal interactions can destabilize homogeneous states.
Pattern formation is linked to the spectrum of a non-symmetric Laplace operator.
Conditions for instability depend on network structure and interaction asymmetry.
Abstract
We study a process of pattern formation for a generic model of species anchored to the nodes of a network where local reactions take place, and that experience non-reciprocal long-range interactions, encoded by the network directed links. By assuming the system to exhibit a stable homogeneous equilibrium whenever only local interactions are considered, we prove that such equilibrium can turn unstable once suitable non-reciprocal long-range interactions are allowed for. Stated differently we propose sufficient conditions allowing for patterns to emerge using a non-symmetric coupling, while initial perturbations about the homogenous equilibrium fade away assuming reciprocal coupling. The instability, precursor of the emerging spatio-temporal patterns, can be traced back, via a linear stability analysis, to the complex spectrum of an interaction non-symmetric Laplace operator. Taken…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEcosystem dynamics and resilience · Nonlinear Dynamics and Pattern Formation · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
