Keyless Authentication for AWGN Channels

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that physical layer authentication in AWGN channels is feasible without secret keys, by modifying existing codes with negligible rate loss, even when adversaries have noisy observations and unlimited power.

Contribution

It introduces a universal method to modify channel codes for authentication in AWGN channels without secret keys, maintaining capacity and robustness against non-omniscient adversaries.

Findings

Authentication capacity equals non-adversarial capacity.

Modification incurs negligible rate penalty.

Applicable to various channel settings.

Abstract

This work establishes that the physical layer can be used to perform information-theoretic authentication in additive white Gaussian noise channels, as long as the adversary is not omniscient. The model considered consists of an encoder, decoder, and adversary, where the adversary has access to the message, a non-causal noisy observation of the encoder's transmission, and unlimited transmission power, while the decoder observes a noisy version of the sum of the encoder and adversary's outputs. A method to modify a generic existing channel code to enable authentication is presented. It is shown that this modification costs an asymptotically negligible amount of the coding rate, while still enabling authentication as long as the adversary's observation is not noiseless. Also notable is that this modification is not (asymptotically) a function of the statistical characterization of the adversary's channel and furthermore no secret key is required, hence paving the way for a robust practical implementation. Using these results, the channel-authenticated capacity is calculated and shown to be equal to the non-adversarial channel capacity. While this modular scheme is designed for use in the given channel model, it is applicable to a wide range of settings.