Cerium ruthenium low-energy antineutrino measurements for safeguarding military naval reactors

TL;DR

This paper proposes a novel antineutrino detection method to safeguard naval reactors, enabling verification of nuclear core integrity without requiring on-board access, thus addressing security and access challenges.

Contribution

It introduces a low-energy antineutrino detection approach using IBD to verify submarine reactor status remotely, bypassing the need for inspector access.

Findings

Detectors can verify reactor core integrity within patrol intervals.

The method can detect diversion of approximately 100 kg of nuclear material.

It can confirm enrichment levels with high confidence.

Abstract

The recent agreement to transfer nuclear submarine reactors and technology from two nuclear-weapon states to a non-nuclear-weapon state (AUKUS deal) highlights an unsolved problem in international safeguards: how to safeguard naval reactor fuel while it is on-board an operational nuclear submarine. Proposals to extend existing safeguards technologies and practices are complicated by the need for civilian international inspectors to gain access to the interior of the submarine and the reactor compartment, which raises national security concerns. In this paper we show that implementing safeguards on submarine propulsion reactors using a low-energy antineutrino reactor-off method, between submarine patrols, can by-pass the need for on-board access all together. We find that, using inverse beta decay (IBD), detectors can achieve a timely and high level of assurance that a submarine's nuclear core has not been diverted (mass of around 100 kg) nor its enrichment level changed (mass of around 10 tons).