Towards Verifiable Remote Voting with Paper Assurance

TL;DR

This paper introduces a protocol for remote voting that combines paper ballots with cryptographic verification, enabling voters to verify their votes are correctly recorded while maintaining some privacy protections.

Contribution

It presents the first system to combine paper assurance with cryptographic verification in a passively receipt-free remote voting protocol.

Findings

Voters can verify their votes were correctly recorded.

The system detects manipulation by adversaries controlling either the device or postal service.

It is the first to combine paper assurance with cryptographic verification in a receipt-free manner.

Abstract

We propose a protocol for verifiable remote voting with paper assurance. It is intended to augment existing postal voting procedures, allowing a ballot to be electronically constructed, printed on paper, then returned in the post. It allows each voter to verify that their vote has been correctly cast, recorded and tallied by the Electoral Commission. The system is not end-to-end verifiable, but does allow voters to detect manipulation by an adversary who controls either the voting device, or (the postal service and electoral commission) but not both. The protocol is not receipt-free, but if the client honestly follows the protocol (including possibly remembering everything), they cannot subsequently prove how they voted. Our proposal is the first to combine plain paper assurance with cryptographic verification in a (passively) receipt-free manner.