Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden

TL;DR
This paper studies how to effectively aggregate expert forecasts under adversarial information structures, introducing the projective substitutes condition and showing how averaging and extremizing forecasts can improve performance.
Contribution
It introduces the projective substitutes condition for forecast aggregation and demonstrates how averaging and extremizing forecasts can outperform trusting a random expert.
Findings
Averaging experts' forecasts improves over trusting a random expert.
Extremizing the average forecast enhances performance when the prior is known.
Theoretical support for extremization techniques used in practice.
Abstract
The problem of aggregating expert forecasts is ubiquitous in fields as wide-ranging as machine learning, economics, climate science, and national security. Despite this, our theoretical understanding of this question is fairly shallow. This paper initiates the study of forecast aggregation in a context where experts' knowledge is chosen adversarially from a broad class of information structures. While in full generality it is impossible to achieve a nontrivial performance guarantee, we show that doing so is possible under a condition on the experts' information structure that we call \emph{projective substitutes}. The projective substitutes condition is a notion of informational substitutes: that there are diminishing marginal returns to learning the experts' signals. We show that under the projective substitutes condition, taking the average of the experts' forecasts improves…
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Taxonomy
TopicsForecasting Techniques and Applications · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
