On Small Types in Univalent Foundations

TL;DR

This paper explores the limitations and properties of small types in univalent foundations without assuming classical axioms, revealing that certain complete posets must be large and cannot have decidable equality, impacting classical theorems.

Contribution

It provides new insights into predicative univalent foundations, showing nontrivial complete posets are necessarily large and analyzing implications for Tarski's theorem and type universe interactions.

Findings

Nontrivial complete posets are necessarily large.

Locally small, nontrivial complete posets lack decidable equality.

Tarski's theorem cannot be applied to nontrivial instances in this setting.

Abstract

We investigate predicative aspects of constructive univalent foundations. By predicative and constructive, we respectively mean that we do not assume Voevodsky's propositional resizing axioms or excluded middle. Our work complements existing work on predicative mathematics by exploring what cannot be done predicatively in univalent foundations. Our first main result is that nontrivial (directed or bounded) complete posets are necessarily large. That is, if such a nontrivial poset is small, then weak propositional resizing holds. It is possible to derive full propositional resizing if we strengthen nontriviality to positivity. The distinction between nontriviality and positivity is analogous to the distinction between nonemptiness and inhabitedness. Moreover, we prove that locally small, nontrivial (directed or bounded) complete posets necessarily lack decidable equality. We prove our results for a general class of posets, which includes e.g. directed complete posets, bounded complete posets, sup-lattices and frames. Secondly, the fact that these nontrivial posets are necessarily large has the important consequence that Tarski's theorem (and similar results) cannot be applied in nontrivial instances. Furthermore, we explain that generalizations of Tarski's theorem that allow for large structures are provably false by showing that the ordinal of ordinals in a univalent universe has small suprema in the presence of set quotients. The latter also leads us to investigate the inter-definability and interaction of type universes of propositional truncations and set quotients, as well as a set replacement principle. Thirdly, we clarify, in our predicative setting, the relation between the traditional definition of sup-lattice that requires suprema for all subsets and our definition that asks for suprema of all small families.