Direct attacks using fake images in iris verification
Virginia Ruiz-Albacete, Pedro Tome-Gonzalez, Fernando, Alonso-Fernandez, Javier Galbally, Julian Fierrez, Javier Ortega-Garcia

TL;DR
This paper investigates the vulnerability of iris recognition systems to direct attacks using printed fake iris images, demonstrating the need for countermeasures to prevent fraud.
Contribution
It introduces a new database of printed fake iris images and evaluates system vulnerability, highlighting the importance of developing anti-spoofing measures.
Findings
Iris recognition systems are vulnerable to printed fake iris attacks.
Printed fake iris images can successfully deceive the system.
Countermeasures are necessary to enhance security against such attacks.
Abstract
In this contribution, the vulnerabilities of iris-based recognition systems to direct attacks are studied. A database of fake iris images has been created from real iris of the BioSec baseline database. Iris images are printed using a commercial printer and then, presented at the iris sensor. We use for our experiments a publicly available iris recognition system, which some modifications to improve the iris segmentation step. Based on results achieved on different operational scenarios, we show that the system is vulnerable to direct attacks, pointing out the importance of having countermeasures against this type of fraudulent actions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsBiometric Identification and Security · User Authentication and Security Systems · Forensic and Genetic Research
