Vaccination Dilemma in the thermodynamic limit
Colin Benjamin, Arjun Krishnan U M

TL;DR
This paper models the vaccination decision-making process in large populations using an analytical approach based on the 1D Ising model, revealing insights into age-dependent vaccination behaviors and informing public health strategies.
Contribution
It introduces a novel application of Nash equilibrium mapping from the 1D Ising model to analyze vaccination choices in the thermodynamic limit, comparing it with other models.
Findings
Nash equilibrium mapping aligns well with agent-based simulations.
Darwinian evolution model diverges from other models in predicting behavior.
Older populations are predicted to have near 100% vaccine coverage, younger populations less so.
Abstract
The vaccination game is a social dilemma that refers to the conundrum individuals face (to get immunized or not) when the population is exposed to an infectious disease. The model has recently gained much traction due to the COVID-19 pandemic since the public perception of vaccines plays a significant role in disease dynamics. This paper studies the vaccination game in the thermodynamic limit with an analytical method derived from the 1D Ising model called Nash equilibrium mapping. The individual dilemma regarding Vaccination comes from an internal conflict wherein one tries to balance the perceived advantages of immunizing with the apparent risks associated with Vaccination which they hear through different news media. We compare the results of Nash equilibrium(NE) mapping to other 1D Ising-based models, namely Darwinian evolution and agent-based simulation. This study aims to analyze…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCOVID-19 epidemiological studies
