Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials
Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck

TL;DR
This paper develops a model for Bayesian persuasion in multi-phase trials with both determined and non-determined experiments, deriving optimal signaling strategies and analyzing the impact of signaling constraints in sequential decision-making.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework for Bayesian persuasion with exogenously fixed experiments, providing a dynamic programming approach for optimal signaling in multi-phase trials.
Findings
Optimal signaling policy for two-phase binary experiments derived.
Dynamic programming algorithm for multi-phase trials developed.
Signaling constraints significantly alter classical persuasion strategies.
Abstract
We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different experiments conducted based on the outcomes of prior experiments. In contrast to most of the literature, we consider the problem with constraints on signals imposed on the sender. This we achieve by fixing some of the experiments in an exogenous manner; these are called determined experiments. This modeling helps us understand real-world situations where this occurs: e.g., multi-phase drug trials where the FDA determines some of the experiments, funding of a startup by a venture capital firm, start-up acquisition by big firms where late-stage assessments are determined by the potential acquirer, multi-round job interviews where the candidates signal initially…
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