Distributed continuous-time strategy-updating rules for noncooperative games with discrete-time communication

TL;DR

This paper introduces discrete-time communication schemes for continuous-time strategy-updating in networked noncooperative games, enabling agents to reach Nash equilibrium efficiently with reduced communication.

Contribution

It proposes periodic and event-triggered discrete communication schemes for continuous-time strategies, ensuring convergence to Nash equilibrium without Zeno behaviors.

Findings

Both schemes guarantee asymptotic convergence to Nash equilibrium.

Event-triggered scheme operates asynchronously, reducing communication load.

Simulations validate effectiveness in Cournot competition networks.

Abstract

In this paper, continuous-time noncooperative games in networks of double-integrator agents are explored. The existing methods require that agents communicate with their neighbors in real time. In this paper, we propose two discrete-time communication schemes based on the designed continuous-time strategy-updating rule for the efficient use of communication resources. First, the property of the designed continuous-time rule is analyzed to ensure that all agents' strategies can converge to the Nash equilibrium. Then, we propose periodic and event-triggered communication schemes for the implementation of the designed rule with discrete-time communication. The rule in the periodic case is implemented synchronously and easily. The rule in the event-triggered case is executed asynchronously without Zeno behaviors. All agents in both cases can asymptotically reach to the Nash equilibrium by interacting with neighbors at discrete times. Simulations are performed in networks of Cournot competition to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.