Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help?
Alon Benhaim, Brett Hemenway Falk, Gerry Tsoukalas

TL;DR
This paper investigates committee-based consensus protocols in blockchains, demonstrating their robustness and efficiency advantages over traditional protocols through empirical and theoretical analysis of voting strategies.
Contribution
It provides a theoretical analysis of voting complexities in CBC protocols and shows that simple strategies converge rapidly to optimality, enhancing blockchain scalability.
Findings
Simple voting strategies converge exponentially quickly to optimality.
CBC protocols are robust and more efficient than lottery-based protocols.
Exponential convergence supports the scalability and reliability of CBC in blockchain systems.
Abstract
In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Binance, Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus (CBC) protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether such protocols ensure that honest committees can be consistently elected, given blockchain users typically have limited information on who to vote for. We show that the approval voting mechanism underlying most CBC protocols is complex and can lead to intractable optimal voting strategies. We empirically characterize some simpler intuitive voting strategies that users tend to resort to in practice and prove that these nonetheless converge to optimality exponentially quickly in the…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
