Scheduler-Pointed False Data Injection Attack for Event-Based Remote State Estimation

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel attack strategy targeting event-based remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems, aiming to impair system performance while evading detection.

Contribution

It proposes a scheduler-pointed false data injection attack that modifies innovation signals, with an algorithm to implement it, demonstrating its effectiveness in degrading estimator performance.

Findings

The attack strategy can always be constructed.

It significantly reduces the effectiveness of the event-based scheduler.

Numerical simulations confirm the theoretical results.

Abstract

In this paper, an attack problem is investigated for event-based remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems. Our objective is to degrade the effect of the event-based scheduler while bypassing a $\chi^2$ false data detector. A two-channel scheduler-pointed false data injection attack strategy is proposed by modifying the numerical characteristics of innovation signals. The attack strategy is proved to be always existent, and an algorithm is provided to find it. Under the proposed attack strategy, the scheduler becomes almost invalid and the performance of the remote estimator is degraded. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate our theoretical results.