EPROACH: A Population Vaccination Game for Strategic Information Design to Enable Responsible COVID Reopening
Shutian Liu, Quanyan Zhu

TL;DR
This paper introduces EPROACH, a strategic game model for population vaccination decisions, to inform safe COVID-19 reopening policies by analyzing equilibrium behaviors and information effects.
Contribution
It develops a novel framework integrating disease spread modeling with strategic vaccination decisions influenced by information, guiding responsible reopening strategies.
Findings
Identifies vaccination coverage thresholds for safe reopening.
Shows how information influences vaccination incentives.
Demonstrates a unique Nash equilibrium in vaccination decisions.
Abstract
The COVID-19 lockdowns have created a significant socioeconomic impact on our society. In this paper, we propose a population vaccination game framework, called EPROACH, to design policies for reopenings that guarantee post-opening public health safety. In our framework, a population of players decides whether to vaccinate or not based on the public and private information they receive. The reopening is captured by the switching of the game state. The insights obtained from our framework include the appropriate vaccination coverage threshold for safe-reopening and information-based methods to incentivize individual vaccination decisions. In particular, our framework bridges the modeling of the strategic behaviors of the populations and the spreading of infectious diseases. This integration enables finding the threshold which guarantees a disease-free epidemic steady state under the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCOVID-19 epidemiological studies · Vaccine Coverage and Hesitancy · SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 Research
