Tiebout sorting in online communities
John Lynham, Philip R. Neary

TL;DR
This paper models online community sorting, showing that making the preferred platform more desirable promotes integration, while revitalizing the inferior platform increases segregation, with integration being more sensitive to platform amenities than intolerance.
Contribution
It introduces a dynamic model of online sorting that highlights how platform desirability influences community segregation and integration outcomes.
Findings
Integration is supported if the platform is sufficiently desirable.
Revitalizing the inferior platform increases segregation.
Integration is more responsive to platform amenities than to intolerance.
Abstract
This paper proposes a stylized, dynamic model to address the issue of sorting online. There are two large homogeneous groups of individuals. Everyone must choose between two online platforms, one of which has superior amenities (akin to having superior local public goods). Each individual enjoys interacting online with those from their own group but dislikes being on the same platform as those in the other group. Unlike a Tiebout model of residential sorting, both platforms have unlimited capacity so there are no constraints on cross-platform migration. It is clear how each group would like to sort themselves but, in the presence of the other type, only the two segregated outcomes are guaranteed to be equilibria. Integration on a platform can be supported in equilibrium as long as the platform is sufficiently desirable. If online integration of the two communities is a desired social…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDigital Platforms and Economics · Sharing Economy and Platforms · ICT Impact and Policies
