GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates the practical feasibility of GPS spoofing attacks on power system measurement units using SDRs and proposes a novel countermeasure employing GPS redundancy and LoRa spread spectrum to detect and prevent such attacks.

Contribution

It provides experimental evidence of GPS spoofing feasibility and introduces a deployable countermeasure using GPS redundancy and LoRa technology for PMU security.

Findings

Experimental validation of GPS spoofing on PMUs

Effective countermeasure using GPS redundancy and LoRa

Ready-to-deploy system for spoofing detection

Abstract

Prior research has demonstrated that global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units (PMUs) can cripple power system operation. This paper provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). It also introduces a novel countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMUs current output. This countermeasure is a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs.