Beyond quadratic speedups in quantum attacks on symmetric schemes

TL;DR

This paper presents the first quantum key-recovery attack on a symmetric block cipher using classical queries, achieving more than quadratic speedup and challenging assumptions about post-quantum security enhancements.

Contribution

It demonstrates a novel quantum attack on the 2XOR-Cascade construction, surpassing quadratic speedup limits and impacting post-quantum security assumptions.

Findings

Quantum attack on 2XOR-Cascade with O(2^n) complexity

Overcomes the quadratic speedup limit of Grover's algorithm

Shows 2XOR-Cascade cannot be securely strengthened against quantum adversaries

Abstract

In this paper, we report the first quantum key-recovery attack on a symmetric block cipher design, using classical queries only, with a more than quadratic time speedup compared to the best classical attack. We study the 2XOR-Cascade construction of Ga\v{z}i and Tessaro (EUROCRYPT~2012). It is a key length extension technique which provides an n-bit block cipher with 5n/2 bits of security out of an n-bit block cipher with 2n bits of key, with a security proof in the ideal model. We show that the offline-Simon algorithm of Bonnetain et al. (ASIACRYPT~2019) can be extended to, in particular, attack this construction in quantum time \~O($2^n$), providing a 2.5 quantum speedup over the best classical attack. Regarding post-quantum security of symmetric ciphers, it is commonly assumed that doubling the key sizes is a sufficient precaution. This is because Grover's quantum search algorithm, and its derivatives, can only reach a quadratic speedup at most. Our attack shows that the structure of some symmetric constructions can be exploited to overcome this limit. In particular, the 2XOR-Cascade cannot be used to generically strengthen block ciphers against quantum adversaries, as it would offer only the same security as the block cipher itself.