The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules
Ioannis Caragiannis, Karl Fehrs

TL;DR
This paper investigates the learnability of approval-based multiwinner voting rules, showing that while they can be learned efficiently from samples, determining specific winning committees remains computationally hard.
Contribution
It demonstrates that ABCS voting rules are PAC-learnable with polynomial samples, but deciding committee winners is computationally intractable.
Findings
Sample complexity for learning ABCS rules is polynomial.
Deciding if a committee can be winning under an ABCS rule is NP-hard.
Results extend to sequential Thiele rules.
Abstract
We study the {PAC} learnability of multiwinner voting, focusing on the class of approval-based committee scoring (ABCS) rules. These are voting rules applied on profiles with approval ballots, where each voter approves some of the candidates. According to ABCS rules, each committee of candidates collects from each voter a score, which depends on the size of the voter's ballot and on the size of its intersection with the committee. Then, committees of maximum score are the winning ones. Our goal is to learn a target rule (i.e., to learn the corresponding scoring function) using information about the winning committees of a small number of sampled profiles. Despite the existence of exponentially many outcomes compared to single-winner elections, we show that the sample complexity is still low: a polynomial number of samples carries enough information for learning the target rule with…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Auction Theory and Applications
