Analysis of a functional response with prey-density dependent handling time from an evolutionary perspective
Cecilia Berardo, Stefan Geritz

TL;DR
This paper investigates how prey-density dependent handling time in predators affects population dynamics and evolutionary outcomes, revealing richer dynamics and potential for predator invasion and coexistence.
Contribution
It introduces a modified functional response with density-dependent handling time into the Rosenzweig-MacArthur model and analyzes its evolutionary implications.
Findings
Density dependence stabilizes populations.
Predators with density-dependent handling time can invade fixed-handling-time populations.
Evolution favors increased density dependence, reducing population cycles.
Abstract
Theoretical models show that in a non-constant environment two predator species feeding on one and the same prey may coexist because the two species occupy different temporal niches: the one with the longer handling time has the advantage when prey is rare so that holding on to the same catch is the better option, while the species with the shorter handling time has the advantage when prey is common and easy to catch. In this paper we address the question whether a predator species with a handling time that is not fixed but decreases with prey density could be selective superior regardless of whether the prey is rare or common, as such predator would be able to occupy both temporal niches all by itself. To that end we study the Rosenzweig-MacArthur model with a modified Holling type II functional response with a density dependent handling time and a handling time dependent conversion…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
