Strategic formation of collaborative networks
Philip Solimine, Luke Boosey

TL;DR
This paper investigates how information and social preferences influence collaborative network formation and contributions, revealing that detailed information boosts efficiency and that reciprocity dynamics are crucial for coordination.
Contribution
It introduces a structural model linking social preferences and network behavior, showing how information and reciprocity shape collaborative outcomes in an experimental setting.
Findings
More detailed information increases efficiency and cooperation.
Reciprocity stimulates mutually beneficial outcomes.
Negative reciprocity can reduce overall efficiency.
Abstract
We examine behavior in an experimental collaboration game that incorporates endogenous network formation. The environment is modeled as a generalization of the voluntary contributions mechanism. By varying the information structure in a controlled laboratory experiment, we examine the underlying mechanisms of reciprocity that generate emergent patterns in linking and contribution decisions. Providing players more detailed information about the sharing behavior of others drastically increases efficiency, and positively affects a number of other key outcomes. To understand the driving causes of these changes in behavior we develop and estimate a structural model for actions and small network panels and identify how social preferences affect behavior. We find that the treatment reduces altruism but stimulates reciprocity, helping players coordinate to reach mutually beneficial outcomes. In…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Economic Policies and Impacts
