Statistical Analysis of ReRAM-PUF based Keyless Encryption Protocol Against Frequency Analysis Attack
Dina Ghanai Miandoab, Sareh Assiri, Joseph Mihaljevic, Bertrand Cambou

TL;DR
This paper evaluates the security of ReRAM PUF-based keyless encryption against frequency analysis attacks using statistical models to assess its randomness and robustness.
Contribution
It introduces a statistical analysis framework to evaluate the security of ReRAM PUF-based keyless encryption protocols, a novel approach in this context.
Findings
The protocol exhibits high randomness in the statistical tests.
It demonstrates strong resistance to frequency analysis attacks.
The analysis confirms the protocol's potential for secure keyless encryption.
Abstract
There has been a growing interest in fully integrating Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) for cryptographic primitives, or keyless encryption. Keyless primitives do not store key information during the entire encryption and decryption phase, providing full security against volatile and non-volatile memory attacks. The concept of keyless encryption using ReRAM PUF is a relatively new concept, and the security aspect of the protocol has not been tested yet. In this paper, we use statistical models to analyze the randomness of the protocol and its resistance against frequency attacks.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · Integrated Circuits and Semiconductor Failure Analysis · Biometric Identification and Security
