Why Most Results of Socio-Technical Security User Studies Are False
Thomas Gross

TL;DR
This paper critically assesses the validity of positive findings in socio-technical security user studies, revealing that most are likely false due to weak evidence and statistical biases, thus questioning the reliability of current research results.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive probabilistic framework to evaluate the strength of evidence in cyber security user studies, highlighting the prevalence of false positives.
Findings
Most positive reports have low a posteriori probabilities.
Few studies achieve strong evidence even with high prior likelihoods.
The field's overall evidence strength is weak, with many results likely false.
Abstract
Background. In recent years, cyber security user studies have been scrutinized for their reporting completeness, statistical reporting fidelity, statistical reliability and biases. It remains an open question what strength of evidence positive reports of such studies actually yield. We focus on the extent to which positive reports indicate relation true in reality, that is, a probabilistic assessment. Aim. This study aims at establishing the overall strength of evidence in cyber security user studies, with the dimensions -- Positive Predictive Value (PPV) and its complement False Positive Risk (FPR), -- Likelihood Ratio (LR), and -- Reverse-Bayesian Prior (RBP) for a fixed tolerated False Positive Risk. Method. Based on coded statistical inferences in cyber security user studies from a published SLR covering the years 2006-2016, we first compute a simulation of the a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsData Quality and Management · Information and Cyber Security · Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
