Collapse of the many-worlds interpretation: Why Everett's theory is typically wrong

TL;DR

This paper critically examines the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, arguing that it fails to justify the probability rule and contradicts empirical laws like Born's law.

Contribution

It provides a detailed analysis showing that Everett's theory cannot establish a consistent probability rule, challenging its validity.

Findings

Everett's interpretation lacks a mechanism for fixing probabilities.

The analysis shows contradictions with empirical facts and Born's law.

The role of typicality and negligible probabilities is critically assessed.

Abstract

We analyze the objective meaning of probabilities in the context of the many-worlds interpretation of Everett. For this purpose we study in details the weak law of large numbers and the role of typicality and universally negligible probabilities (through the works of Cournot and Borel). We demonstrate that Everett's theory doesn't provide any clue for fixing a probability rule and therefore contradicts irrevocably empirical facts and Born's law.