Security-Hardening Software Libraries with Ada and SPARK -- A TCP Stack Use Case

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates how replacing C code with formally verified SPARK Ada code and modeling dependencies improves the security and reliability of an embedded TCP/IP stack, detecting and fixing bugs.

Contribution

It introduces a multifaceted approach using SPARK and symbolic execution to enhance security and reliability of C-based TCP/IP stacks.

Findings

Detected and fixed two bugs in the TCP layer.

Significantly enhanced security and reliability of the TCP/IP stack.

Applicable approach for hardening critical C libraries.

Abstract

This white paper demonstrates how the assurance, reliability, and security of an existing professional-grade, open-source embedded TCP/IP stack implementation written in the C programming language is significantly enhanced by adopting the SPARK technology. A multifaceted approach achieves this. Firstly, the TCP layer's C code is being replaced with formally verified SPARK, a subset of the Ada programming language supported by formal verification tools. Then the lower layers, still written in C and on which the TCP layer depends, are modeled using SPARK contracts and validated using symbolic execution with KLEE. Finally, formal contracts for the upper layers are defined to call the TCP layer. The work allowed the detection and correction of two bugs in the TCP layer. In an increasingly connected world, where Cyber Security is of paramount importance, the powerful approach detailed in this work can be applied to any existing critical C library to harden their reliability and security significantly.