A Distributed Process Model of Cryptographic Protocols

TL;DR

This paper introduces a formal distributed process model for cryptographic protocols, enabling rigorous description and verification of their correctness and security properties in insecure environments.

Contribution

It presents a novel formal model for cryptographic protocols that facilitates their analysis and verification, addressing the need for mathematical substantiation of their security.

Findings

Model allows formal description of cryptographic protocols

Enables verification of protocol correctness and security

Supports analysis of protocols in insecure environments

Abstract

Cryptographic Protocols (CP) are distributed algorithms intended for secure communication in an insecure environment. They are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, systems of confidential data processing, etc. Errors in CPs can bring to great financial and social damage, therefore it is necessary to use mathematical methods to substantiate the correctness and safety of CPs. In this paper, a distributed process model of CPs is presented, which allows one to formally describe CPs and their properties. It is shown how to solve the problems of verification of CPs on the base of this model.