Strategic Remote Attestation: Testbed for Internet-of-Things Devices and Stackelberg Security Game for Optimal Strategies

TL;DR

This paper develops a testbed for IoT remote attestation and models the strategic decision-making process as a Stackelberg security game to optimize defense strategies against adversaries.

Contribution

It introduces a novel testbed for evaluating remote attestation methods and formulates a game-theoretic model for strategic decision-making in IoT security.

Findings

Optimal strategies reduce security losses significantly.

Testbed effectively measures detection accuracy and overhead.

Game-theoretic approach outperforms naive strategies.

Abstract

Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defender to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages and disadvantages in terms of detection accuracy and computational cost. Further, an attestation method may be applied in multiple ways, such as various levels of software coverage. Therefore, to minimize both security risks and computational overhead, defenders need to decide strategically which attestation methods to apply and how to apply them, depending on the characteristic of the devices and the potential losses. To answer these questions, we first develop a testbed for remote attestation of IoT devices, which enables us to measure the detection accuracy and performance overhead of various attestation methods. Our testbed integrates two example IoT applications, memory-checksum based attestation, and a variety of software vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to inject arbitrary code into running applications. Second, we model the problem of finding an optimal strategy for applying remote attestation as a Stackelberg security game between a defender and an adversary. We characterize the defender's optimal attestation strategy in a variety of special cases. Finally, building on experimental results from our testbed, we evaluate our model and show that optimal strategic attestation can lead to significantly lower losses than naive baseline strategies.