Strategic Remote Attestation: Testbed for Internet-of-Things Devices and Stackelberg Security Game for Optimal Strategies
Shanto Roy, Salah Uddin Kadir, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Aron, Laszka

TL;DR
This paper develops a testbed for IoT remote attestation and models the strategic decision-making process as a Stackelberg security game to optimize defense strategies against adversaries.
Contribution
It introduces a novel testbed for evaluating remote attestation methods and formulates a game-theoretic model for strategic decision-making in IoT security.
Findings
Optimal strategies reduce security losses significantly.
Testbed effectively measures detection accuracy and overhead.
Game-theoretic approach outperforms naive strategies.
Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defender to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages and disadvantages in terms of detection accuracy and computational cost. Further, an attestation method may be applied in multiple ways, such as various levels of software coverage. Therefore, to minimize both security risks and computational overhead, defenders need to decide strategically which attestation methods to apply and how to apply them, depending on the characteristic of the devices and the potential losses. To answer these questions, we first develop a testbed for remote…
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