Team Correlated Equilibria in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games via Tree Decompositions
Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel tree decomposition-based algorithm for efficiently computing correlated equilibria in extensive-form team games, especially under common external information conditions, outperforming previous methods.
Contribution
The paper presents a new algorithm that uses tree decompositions to solve team games more efficiently, handling larger game sizes and complex information structures.
Findings
Achieves state-of-the-art performance on benchmark games.
Reduces problem size to a linear program with fewer constraints.
Handles complex external information structures effectively.
Abstract
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient algorithms for certain families of team game. In particular, if the game has common external information, also known as A-loss recall -- informally, actions played by non-team members (i.e., the opposing team or nature) are either unknown to the entire team, or common knowledge within the team -- then polynomial-time algorithms exist (Kaneko & Kline 1995). In this paper, we devise a completely new algorithm for solving team games. It uses a tree decomposition of the constraint system representing each team's strategy to reduce the number and degree of constraints required for correctness (tightness of the mathematical program). Our approach has the bags…
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Taxonomy
TopicsArtificial Intelligence in Games · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications
