Principal Agent Problem as a Principled Approach to Electronic Counter-Countermeasures in Radar
Anurag Gupta, Vikram Krishnamurthy

TL;DR
This paper models the radar's electronic counter-countermeasures as a principal-agent problem, enabling optimal ECCM strategy design through convex optimization and analysis of information mismatches.
Contribution
It introduces a novel PAP framework for radar ECCM, demonstrating convexity and providing conditions for low-cost optimal solutions.
Findings
PAP formulation leads to convex optimization for ECCM strategies.
Optimal ECCM strategies can be computed efficiently as increasing affine functions.
Numerical simulations validate the PAP approach and analyze information mismatches.
Abstract
Electronic countermeasures (ECM) against a radar are actions taken by an adversarial jammer to mitigate effective utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum by the radar. On the other hand, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) are actions taken by the radar to mitigate the impact of electronic countermeasures (ECM) so that the radar can continue to operate effectively. The main idea of this paper is to show that ECCM involving a radar and a jammer can be formulated as a principal-agent problem (PAP) - a problem widely studied in microeconomics. With the radar as the principal and the jammer as the agent, we design a PAP to optimize the radar's ECCM strategy in the presence of a jammer. The radar seeks to optimally trade-off signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the target measurement with the measurement cost: cost for generating radiation power for the pulse to probe the target. We show…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCorruption and Economic Development · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
