IceClave: A Trusted Execution Environment for In-Storage Computing
Luyi Kang, Yuqi Xue, Weiwei Jia, Xiaohao Wang, Jongryool Kim,, Changhwan Youn, Myeong Joon Kang, Hyung Jin Lim, Bruce Jacob, Jian Huang

TL;DR
IceClave introduces a lightweight trusted execution environment within SSDs to enhance security for in-storage computing, effectively preventing malicious attacks while maintaining high performance and low hardware overhead.
Contribution
The paper presents IceClave, the first trusted execution environment for in-storage computing that ensures security isolation and data integrity within SSD controllers.
Findings
IceClave achieves only 7.6% performance overhead.
It provides up to 2.31× performance improvement over host-based trusted computing.
IceClave enforces security with minimal hardware cost.
Abstract
In-storage computing with modern solid-state drives (SSDs) enables developers to offload programs from the host to the SSD. It has been proven to be an effective approach to alleviate the I/O bottleneck. To facilitate in-storage computing, many frameworks have been proposed. However, few of them treat the in-storage security as the first citizen. Specifically, since modern SSD controllers do not have a trusted execution environment, an offloaded (malicious) program could steal, modify, and even destroy the data stored in the SSD. In this paper, we first investigate the attacks that could be conducted by offloaded in-storage programs. To defend against these attacks, we build a lightweight trusted execution environment, named IceClave for in-storage computing. IceClave enables security isolation between in-storage programs and flash management functions that include flash address…
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