Infinite utility: counterparts and ultimate locations
Adam Jonsson

TL;DR
This paper addresses the infinite ethics locations problem, arguing that 'people at times' are the ultimate moral locations, which helps resolve issues of comparability and ranking in infinite ethical frameworks.
Contribution
It defends the view that 'people at times' are the ultimate locations, providing a solution to the unsettling implications of time- and person-centered approaches in infinite ethics.
Findings
Broad class of worlds can be strictly ranked
Incomparability issues are resolved under the proposed view
Time- and person-centered approaches can be harmonized
Abstract
The locations problem in infinite ethics concerns the relative moral status of different categories of potential bearers of value, the primary examples of which are people and points in time. The challenge is to determine which category of value bearers are of ultimate moral significance: the ultimate locations, for short. This paper defends the view that the ultimate locations are 'people at times'. A person at a time is not a specific person, but the person born at a specific point in time (de dicto). The main conclusion of the paper is that the unsettling implications of the time- and person-centered approaches to infinite ethics can be avoided. Most notably, a broad class of worlds that person-centered views deem incomparable can be strictly ranked.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophical Ethics and Theory · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
