Eavesdropping a Quantum Key Distribution network using sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks

TL;DR

This paper explores how sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks can be used to eavesdrop on a quantum key distribution network, revealing vulnerabilities and the potential for multiple eavesdroppers to extract secret information.

Contribution

It introduces a novel analysis of eavesdropping via unsharp measurements in a one-sided device-independent QKD setup, demonstrating the possibility of multiple eavesdroppers gaining information.

Findings

Eavesdroppers can obtain positive key rates while preserving quantum correlations.

The secret key rate for legitimate parties is reduced but remains positive.

An unbounded number of eavesdroppers can extract secret information under certain conditions.

Abstract

We investigate the possibility of eavesdropping on a quantum key distribution network by local sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks by the eavesdropper. In particular, we consider a pure two-qubit state shared between two parties Alice and Bob, sharing quantum steerable correlations that form the one-sided device-independent quantum key distribution network. One qubit of the shared state is with Alice and the other one while going to the Bob's place is intercepted by multiple sequential eavesdroppers who perform quantum unsharp measurement attacks thus gaining some positive key rate while preserving the quantum steerable correlations for the Bob. In this way, Bob will also have a positive secret key rate although reduced. However, this reduction is not that sharp and can be perceived due to decoherence and imperfection of the measurement devices. At the end, we show that an unbounded number of eavesdroppers can also get secret information in some specific scenario.